Weaponised Interdependence: The New Geopolitical Risk for Global Tech Hubs
Political scientist Abraham Newman warns that the era of decentralized globalization has been replaced by 'weaponised interdependence,' where centralized technical hubs are used for state coercion. This shift transforms global supply chains and digital infrastructure from efficiency drivers into primary vectors for geopolitical surveillance and exclusion.
Mentioned
Key Intelligence
Key Facts
- 1Globalisation is highly centralised in 'choke points' like TSMC (chips), Apple/Google (OS), and SWIFT (finance).
- 2States leverage these hubs for coercion, surveillance, and cutting adversaries out of key networks.
- 3The term 'weaponised interdependence' describes the shift from market efficiency to strategic vulnerability.
- 4Abraham Newman and Henry Farrell's book 'Underground Empire' details how the US weaponised the world economy.
- 5A 'neo-royalist' order suggests a move toward state-centric control over global networks rather than rules-based trade.
- 6Tech giants are increasingly viewed as strategic national assets rather than independent global firms.
| Feature | ||
|---|---|---|
| Power Structure | Decentralised / Flat | Highly Centralised / Hub-and-Spoke |
| Primary Goal | Economic Efficiency | Strategic Control / Security |
| Role of the State | Regulator / Facilitator | Active Coercer / Sovereign |
| Key Vulnerability | Market Volatility | Network Exclusion / Surveillance |
Who's Affected
Analysis
The prevailing myth of globalization as a 'flat world'—where power is decentralized and corporations operate beyond the reach of state control—has been fundamentally dismantled. According to political scientist Abraham Newman, co-author of 'Underground Empire,' the modern global economy is actually characterized by extreme centralization. This centralization exists within specific 'choke points' such as the semiconductor manufacturing of TSMC and Samsung, the mobile operating systems of Apple and Google, and the financial messaging architecture of the SWIFT system. In this new era, these hubs are no longer just engines of economic efficiency; they have become the primary tools of statecraft, a phenomenon Newman describes as weaponised interdependence.
This shift represents a critical evolution in the threat landscape for cybersecurity and intelligence professionals. Historically, the primary concern for global tech infrastructure was protecting against non-state actors or industrial espionage. Today, the infrastructure itself is being leveraged by states for surveillance and coercion. By controlling the centralized nodes of communication and production, powerful states can monitor the activities of adversaries or, more drastically, 'unplug' them from the global network entirely. This turns standard technical dependencies into strategic vulnerabilities. For instance, a nation’s reliance on a specific operating system or a single semiconductor supplier is no longer just a supply chain risk; it is a geopolitical liability that can be exploited for national security objectives.
This centralization exists within specific 'choke points' such as the semiconductor manufacturing of TSMC and Samsung, the mobile operating systems of Apple and Google, and the financial messaging architecture of the SWIFT system.
The second term of U.S. President Donald Trump is expected to accelerate this trend toward a 'neo-royalist' world order. In this framework, international relations are increasingly defined by loyalty and direct control rather than adherence to a rules-based neoliberal system. Under this model, the 'king' (the state) exerts sovereign authority over the 'roads' (the global networks). This has profound implications for companies like Apple, Google, and TSMC, which find themselves caught in the middle of great power competition. These firms are increasingly viewed as strategic assets of their home nations, forcing them to navigate a landscape where technical decisions are inseparable from geopolitical ones.
For the cybersecurity industry, this means that threat intelligence must now account for state-level manipulation of core infrastructure. The risk is not just a data breach or a ransomware attack, but the systemic exclusion of an entire market or the weaponization of a software update for mass surveillance. As states continue to exploit these dependencies, we are likely to see a defensive fragmentation of the internet and supply chains. Nations may seek to build their own 'sovereign' stacks to avoid the vulnerabilities inherent in weaponised interdependence, leading to a more fractured and less efficient global digital economy. The long-term consequence is a world where security is defined by the depth of one's control over the network, rather than the strength of one's firewalls.
Ultimately, the 'age of weaponised interdependence' forces a re-evaluation of global risk. Organizations can no longer assume that the platforms they build upon are neutral. Instead, they must recognize that every centralized service is a potential point of leverage for state actors. As we move forward, the ability to map these dependencies and understand the geopolitical motivations behind them will be as crucial as any technical security measure. The 'Underground Empire' is not a hidden conspiracy, but the visible reality of how power is exercised in the 21st century.